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The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

安徽省合肥市人民政府办公厅


关于印发合肥市市级政府公物仓管理暂行办法的通知

合政办〔2012〕11号


各县（市）、区人民政府，市政府各部门、各直属机构：

　　《合肥市市级政府公物仓管理暂行办法》已经市政府同意，现印发给你们，请认真遵照执行。

　　 二○一二年四月八日



合肥市市级政府公物仓管理暂行办法

　　第一章 总 则

　　第一条　为建立配置合理、处置规范、监督到位的国有资产运行机制，提高资产使用效益，维护国有资产安全，根据《关于进一步加强行政事业单位国有资产管理的意见》（合政〔2008〕132号）和有关规定，制定本办法。

　　第二条 本办法适用市级党的机关、人大机关、行政机关、政协机关、审判机关、检察机关、各民主党派机关和各类事业单位（以下简称市直行政事业单位）以及经市委、市政府批准成立的临时机构。

　　第三条 合肥市市级政府公物仓（以下简称公物仓）是指：对市直行政事业单位闲置、处置、超标准配置的资产以及临时机构的资产和执法执纪单位罚没物品、收归国有的涉案物品等资产实行统一管理、统一调配、统一处置的运作平台。

　　第四条 公物仓资产管理遵循以下原则：

　　（一）统一管理，优化配置原则。

　　（二）科学整合，盘活资产原则。

　　（三）共享共用，提高效益原则。

　　（四）公开透明，高效运转原则。

　　第五条 公物仓资产按照用途分为房屋构筑物、通用设备、专用设备、交通运输设备、电气设备、电子产品及通讯设备、仪器仪表及量具、文艺体育设备、图书文物及陈列品、家具用具及其他等。

　　第二章 管理机构及职责

　　第六条 市财政局是管理公物仓的职能部门，对公物仓资产实施综合管理，主要职责是：

　　（一）贯彻执行国家、省、市有关行政事业单位国有资产管理的法律、法规和政策。

　　（二）研究制定公物仓管理相关规章制度。

　　（三）组建公物仓管理机构。

　　（四）审批公物仓资产收缴、调出、借用和处置等事项。

　　（五）监督检查公物仓日常管理及执行情况。

　　第七条 公物仓管理机构负责公物仓的日常管理，主要职责是：

　　（一）贯彻执行公物仓管理制度。

　　（二）负责公物仓资产的仓储管理、财务管理和会计核算。

　　（三）负责公物仓资产的收缴、调出、借用、处置和收益上缴。

　　（四）建立公物仓资产管理信息平台，及时提供公物仓资产的相关信息。

　　（五）定期向市财政局报送公物仓资产管理情况。

　　第八条 市直行政事业单位主管部门负责对本部门所属行政事业单位涉及公物仓资产管理事项实施监督管理，主要职责是：

　　（一）审核本部门所属行政事业单位借用公物仓资产。

　　（二）监督本部门所属行政事业单位使用公物仓资产。

　　（三）督促本部门所属行政事业单位按规定及时上缴、归还公物仓资产。

　　第九条 市直行政事业单位主要职责是：负责本单位使用公物仓资产的日常维护和保养工作，保证公物仓资产使用安全和完整，及时归还公物仓资产。

　　第三章 公物仓管理范围及上缴

　　第十条 除国家、省、市另有规定外,下列国有资产缴入公物仓管理和处置:

　　（一）闲置的资产。超量占用的资产、长期不使用的资产等。具体包括: 房屋构筑物、通用设备、专用设备、交通运输设备、电气设备、电子产品及通讯设备、家具用具等。

　　（二）淘汰的资产。按照《关于进一步加强行政事业单位国有资产管理的意见》（合政〔2008〕132号）的规定,由市财政局备案或审批的资产。

　　（三）超标准配置的资产。超过规定配置标准,应上缴或处置的资产。

　　（四）更新的资产。市财政预算安排资金购置新增资产后,原有需要处置的资产。

　　（五）罚没、收归国有的涉案物品等。

　　（六）市直行政事业单位（临时机构）撤销时需要处置的资产。

　　（七）市财政承担经费举办的大型会议、展览、典礼、普查、调查等活动购置或接受捐赠的资产。

　　（八）其他应缴入公物仓管理和处置的资产。

　　第十一条 应缴入公物仓管理和处置资产上缴要求。

　　（一）闲置的资产。各单位应在每年年末对占用的固定资产进行清查盘点,于次年3月31日之前将本单位闲置资产报市财政局备案后缴入公物仓。

　　（二）淘汰的资产。经市财政局备案或审批后5日内，由各单位缴入公物仓。

　　（三）超标准配置的资产。应在市财政局通知后5日内，由各单位缴入公物仓。

　　（四）更新的资产。新增资产采购验收后5日内，由各单位将原有需要处置的资产缴入公物仓。

　　（五）罚没、涉案物品。应当在案件结束后30日内,将罚没、收归国有的涉案物品缴入公物仓。

　　（六）市直行政事业单位（临时机构）撤销时需要处置的资产。由使用单位清查登记,在机构撤销后30日内缴入公物仓。

　　（七）其他应缴入公物仓管理和处置的资产。履行资产处置审批手续后5日内，由各单位缴入公物仓。

　　对于不宜集中或运输成本较高的物品，可以在办理上缴手续后，暂由单位保管。

　　第十二条 公物仓管理机构在接收资产时,应当对接收的资产进行现场查验,并提供“合肥市市级公物仓资产专用收据”。

　　第十三条 市直行政事业单位在核销上缴资产账务时，须依据市财政局相关批复文件或备案材料和公物仓管理机构提供的“合肥市市级公物仓资产专用收据”。

　　第四章 公物仓资产调出、借用和处置

　　第十四条 公物仓资产的调出。市直行政事业单位申请年度追加经费购置资产的，由单位提出资产购置申请，经市财政局审核后，优先从公物仓调剂。调剂程序如下：

　　（一）市财政局根据资产购置单位的申请审核批复资产调剂意见，函复相关市直行政事业单位和公物仓管理机构。

　　（二）市直行政事业单位凭市财政局资产调剂意见，与公物仓管理机构办理资产调出手续。

　　（三）市直行政事业单位登记入账调入资产。

　　公物仓调出房屋、建筑物、土地使用权、车辆及大型（贵重）仪器设备等重大资产，应严格按照程序报经市政府同意后办理调出手续。

　　第十五条 公物仓资产的借用。经批准成立的市级临时机构和市财政承担经费举办的大型会议、展览、典礼、普查、调查等活动需要配置资产的，可以从公物仓借用。借用程序如下：

　　（一）市财政局审核批复资产借用意见。

　　（二）资产借用单位凭市财政局审核批复的意见，与公物仓管理机构办理资产借用相关手续。

　　（三）资产借用单位确保借用资产借用期间安全完整，借用期间发生非正常毁损的，由借用单位按价赔偿或从单位经费中扣回。

　　（四）资产借用单位应于活动结束后5日内，将借用资产归还公物仓。对逾期超过30日的，按资产原价从借用单位经费中扣回。

　　公物仓借出房屋、建筑物、车辆及大型（贵重）仪器设备等重大资产，应严格按照程序报经市政府同意后办理借出手续。

　　第十六条 公物仓资产处置。公物仓资产需要处置的，由公物仓管理机构提出申请，经市财政局批准后公开处置。程序如下:

　　（一）公物仓管理机构定期清查盘点资产，根据清查盘点结果，向市财政局报送处置资产清单和处置方案。

　　（二）市财政局审核批复公物仓管理机构提出的资产处置方案，委托具有资质的中介机构对处置资产进行评估。

　　（三）公物仓管理机构根据市财政局批复的资产处置方案，以备案评估价格为底价，委托合肥招标投标中心进行公开处置。

　　公物仓处置房屋、建筑物、土地使用权、车辆及大型（贵重）仪器设备等重大资产，应严格按照程序报经市政府同意后进行处置。

　　对于不宜集中或运输成本较高的物品，可以在报经市财政局批准后,由市财政局会同公物仓管理机构、行政事业单位主管部门进行现场查验,按照规定程序进行处置。

　　第十七条 公物仓管理机构处置资产收入,按照“收支两条线”规定,全额上缴市级国库,发生的相关费用由市财政另行安排。

　　公物仓管理机构运行所需经费，由市财政预算安排。

　　第五章 监督检查

　　第十八条 市财政局定期对公物仓的日常运行情况实施监督检查。

　　第十九条 市财政局每年会同市监察局、市审计局对公物仓的运行情况进行评价，定期向市政府报告。

　　第六章 法律责任

　　第二十条 市直行政事业单位违反本办法规定的，由市财政局责令其限期纠正，并根据情况对单位给予警告或通报批评，责成单位对相关责任工作人员给予行政处分。

　　第二十一条 公物仓管理机构及其工作人员违反本办法规定，擅自处置资产或隐瞒、拖欠、截留、侵占、私分国有资产收入的，由市财政局依法追究单位及相关责任人责任；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。

　　第二十二条 市财政局及其工作人员违反本办法相关规定的，按照《财政违法行为处罚处分条例》（国务院令第427号）有关规定处理；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。

　　第七章 附 则

　　第二十三条 各县（市）、区、开发区可以根据本办法，制定具体实施办法，报市财政局备案。

　　第二十四条 本办法印发之日起实行，有效期3年。